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 The apparent stability of social network structures may 
mask considerable change and adjustment in the ties that 
make up the structures. In this study, we theorize and 
test—using longitudinal data on friendship relations from 
a radiology department located in the Netherlands—the 
idea that the characteristics of this “network churn” and 
the resultant brokerage dynamics are traceable to indi-
vidual differences in self-monitoring personality. High 
self-monitors were more likely than low self-monitors to 
attract new friends and to occupy new bridging positions 
over time. In comparison to low self-monitors, the new 
friends that high self-monitors attracted tended to be 
relative strangers, in the sense that they were uncon-
nected with previous friends, came from different func-
tions, and more effi ciently increased the number of 
structural holes in the resultant network. Our study 
suggests that dispositional forces help shape the dynamic 
structuring of networks: individuals help (re)create the 
social network structures they inhabit. • 
 Organizations are, among other things, social arenas in which 
people form, change, and dissolve relationships with their 
colleagues. We know that the structure of these relationships 
considered at a given point in time matters. In particular, there 
is considerable evidence that individuals who occupy broker-
age positions bridging the “structural holes” between discon-
nected others in the workplace receive higher performance 
evaluations and faster promotions (e.g., Burt, 1992, 2005, 
2010). While it is no doubt useful to know that certain net-
work structures can be advantageous, a theory that accounts 
for the appearance, transformation, and disappearance of 
network structures may provide us with a better understand-
ing of the mechanisms responsible for observed network 
effects (Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994) and a richer apprecia-
tion for how collective action is organized (Salancik, 1995). 
 Research has tended to treat social networks as relatively 
static (e.g., Moreno, 1953; cf. Nadel, 1957: 125–152). But 
there is growing recognition that networks are in fact dynamic 
systems (e.g., Weesie and Flap, 1990; Barabasi and Albert, 
1999; see Doreian et al., 1996; Newman, Barabasi, and 
Watts, 2006). Certain global characteristics of a network (such 
as its overall connectivity) can appear to be stable, but this 
apparent stability may mask ongoing change and adjustment 
in the ties that constitute the network. A recent reanalysis of 
a classic study of friendship networks (Newcomb, 1961) 
found that whereas earlier studies had concluded that the 
network had quickly stabilized, there was in fact considerable 
evidence of change at the level of individual ties throughout 
the observation period (Moody, McFarland, and Bender-
deMoll, 2005). The origins of these network dynamics are 
important to understand because they could help explain how 
network structures appear to retain their stability even as the 
ties they are composed of are changing. 
 Over time, brokers may try to create new bridging relations 
with new people, keep apart the people they have been 
bridging, or attempt to bring together the people they 
previously bridged. Although structural holes theory makes 
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inferences about the brokerage dynamics that underlie the 
performance advantages of brokerage, empirical research 
on network brokerage has rarely examined the opening or 
closing of holes (notable exceptions are Burt, 2002; Obstfeld, 
2005). Instead, the tendency has been to put aside the 
question of agency by assuming that self-interested, rational 
actors are universally motivated to maintain their brokerage 
positions and create new ones (e.g., Ryall and Sorenson, 
2007; Buskens and van de Rijt, 2008; see the discussion in 
Burt, 2010: 221–227). This assumption has had the merit of 
simplifying theory and analysis, allowing network research-
ers to concentrate their attention on the effects of network 
structure on performance. But it is inconsistent with sub-
stantial evidence from psychology indicating that individuals 
differ markedly in terms of their social motivations and 
abilities (for a recent review, see John, Robins, and Pervin, 
2008). 
 Network research, at least since the 1970s, has largely 
eschewed analytical approaches that direct attention to 
individual differences (e.g., Mayhew, 1984; Wellman and 
Berkowitz, 1988; Marin and Wellman, 2011; cf. Boissevain, 
1974), but it is likely to be precisely such individual differ-
ences that inﬂ uence network dynamics. To the extent that 
brokerage in workplace social networks creates competitive 
advantage, there is a strong incentive for becoming a broker. 
At the same time, bridges are difﬁ cult to build, costly to 
maintain, and vulnerable to decay (Burt, 2002; Kossinets and 
Watts, 2006; Ryall and Sorenson, 2007). Bridge building may 
be proﬁ table, but it seems unlikely that everyone has the 
motivation or ability to build bridges. Moreover, the results of 
mathematical simulations suggest that if all individuals were 
equally motivated and skilled at pursuing the performance 
advantages of brokerage, the result would likely be a competi-
tive battle in which it is unclear how brokerage positions could 
emerge or persist (Ryall and Sorenson, 2007; Buskens and 
van de Rijt, 2008). It seems more likely that some actors may 
be natural brokers while others may lack the motivation to 
step into brokerage roles, or they may simply fail to detect 
opportunities for network brokerage in the network around 
them. The relationship between network brokerage and 
workplace success may apply across different kinds of 
people, as prior research has shown. But the possibility that 
different kinds of people may be more likely to construct 
different kinds of networks deserves greater attention (cf. 
Burt, 2005: 47–50; Buskens and van de Rijt, 2008; Kilduff and 
Krackhardt, 2008: 4). 
 Previous cross-sectional work has suggested that individual 
differences in personality are related to the structure of 
individuals’ social networks (e.g., Klein et al., 2004; Oh and 
Kilduff, 2008). The personality construct of self-monitoring 
may be particularly relevant because of its theoretical empha-
sis on how identity and impression management skills 
inﬂ uence the structuring of interpersonal relationships (Snyder, 
1987: 59–70; Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass, 2001; Flynn et al., 
2006). Work organizations are sites of self-presentation 
activities that are vital to the formation and dissolution of 
friendships (Snyder and Copeland, 1989; cf. Fine, 1986) and 
form the backdrop for changes in the volume, composition, 
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and patterns of changes in individuals’ personal networks, 
which we refer to as “network churn,” and the resultant 
brokerage dynamics (the opening and closing of brokerage 
positions over time). 
 In this paper, we take actor heterogeneity explicitly into 
account in the form of differences in self-monitoring and 
examine whether self-monitoring theory offers insight into 
network churn and the dynamics that underlie network 
brokerage. Of the different social network ties in the work-
place, the one we focus on here is friendship. Not only do 
affect-intensive ties such as friendship play a crucial role in 
workplace success and satisfaction (e.g., Roethlisberger and 
Dickson, 1939; Fine, 1986; cf. Casciaro and Lobo, 2008), 
they are relatively discretionary and are therefore most likely 
to be shaped by personality differences. If the relationship 
between self-monitoring and network brokerage proves to 
be stable despite (or due to) network churn, this would 
support our overarching theoretical contention that disposi-
tional forces help shape the dynamics of social networks in 
predictable ways. 
 EFFECTS OF SELF-MONITORING ON NETWORK 
CHURN 
 Drawing on the impression management tradition initiated 
by William James and Erving Goffman, the theory of self-
monitoring concerns the “processes by which individuals 
actively plan, enact, and guide their behavioral choices in 
social situations” (Snyder and Cantor, 1980: 222; Snyder, 
1974). Evidence for the validity of the self-monitoring con-
struct is extensive. Hundreds of studies have tested theoreti-
cally based hypotheses about the role of self-monitoring in 
the behavioral, cognitive, and interpersonal domains (for 
reviews and meta-analyses, see Snyder, 1987; Gangestad and 
Snyder, 2000; Day et al., 2002; Day and Schleicher, 2006). 
Self-monitoring appears to be stable across the lifespan (e.g., 
Gangestad and Snyder, 1985). 
 At the heart of self-monitoring theory is the idea that individu-
als differ markedly in the extent to which they are able and 
motivated to engage in the expressive control required to 
create appropriate self-presentations. Like good actors, high 
self-monitors carefully control their expressive behaviors (for 
evidence that professional stage actors tend to be high 
self-monitors, see Snyder, 1974). A number of studies have 
found that high self-monitors are able to accurately convey a 
variety of intended emotions through both vocal and facial 
channels of expression (Snyder, 1974; Snyder and Monson, 
1975; Riggio and Friedman, 1986; for a review, see 
 Gangestad and Snyder, 2000). 
 Not only do high self-monitors carefully control their expres-
sive behaviors, they are highly attuned to cues of situational 
appropriateness (e.g., Harris, 1989). Studies have shown that 
high self-monitors closely monitor the thoughts, actions, and 
feelings of those around them (e.g., Funder and Harris, 1986; 
Ickes et al., 1990; Toegel, Anand, and Kilduff, 2007). When 
offered the opportunity to do so, high self-monitors consult 
information about their peers more often and longer than do 
their low self-monitoring counterparts (Rhodewalt and Comer, 
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1981), a tendency that has been documented—using a 
children’s version of the self-monitoring scale—in children as 
young as seven years old (Leone et al., 1984). Experimental 
evidence suggests that the attention high self-monitors pay to 
others is such that they are willing to “buy,” at some cost to 
themselves, information that may help them create appropri-
ate self-presentations (Elliott, 1979). The close attention they 
pay to others, moreover, is not restricted to their verbal 
expressions but extends to their non-verbal expressive 
behaviors (e.g., Brandt, Miller, and Hocking, 1980) and even 
to the structure of others’ social networks (Flynn et al., 2006). 
 Theory and evidence suggest that high self-monitors are 
motivated to use the rich information they collect about 
others tactically to create value by creating favorable images 
of themselves in the eyes of their interaction partners. For 
example, high self-monitors use their (relatively accurate) 
knowledge of exchange relations among organizational 
members to gain high-status reputations among colleagues 
(Flynn et al., 2006) and supervisors (Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass, 
2001). High self-monitors have been described as “consum-
mate social pragmatists,” able and motivated to project 
images designed to evoke positive affect and conferrals of 
status in their relations with others (Gangestad and Snyder, 
2000: 531; DeBono, 1987). 
 Low self-monitors, by contrast, are less attuned to social 
expectations than to their own beliefs and values. Whereas 
the prototypic high self-monitor is motivated to produce 
situationally appropriate emotions and behaviors designed to 
win status conferrals, the prototypic low self-monitor strives 
to produce emotions and behaviors that are consistent with 
internal beliefs and values, even when these beliefs and 
values are situationally inappropriate. Low self-monitors seem 
“not only unwilling but also unable to carry off appearances”; 
they live as if “put-on images are falsehoods, as if only those 
public displays true to their privately experienced self are 
principled” (Gangestad and Snyder, 2000: 531). Although it 
has the beneﬁ ts of providing self-validation, the principled 
approach to self-presentation characteristic of low self-monitors 
runs the risk of narrowing the set of conditions under which 
they will be seen as likable (Day and Schleicher, 2006), which 
may be reﬂ ected in differences between low and high 
self-monitors in network churn—the volume, composition, 
and patterns of changes in their networks over time. 
 Network Churn 
 Volume.  One way to conceptualize network churn is in terms 
of the volume or number of ties added over time. A popular 
network account of tie emergence relies on a preferential-
attachment logic whereby those with many ties tend to 
accumulate even more ties over time (e.g., Price, 1965; 
Barabasi and Albert, 1999; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Zaheer 
and Soda, 2009; for a detailed discussion, see Newman, 
2010). Going beyond this structural logic, individual differ-
ences in self-monitoring personality may offer insight into 
why some people gain more friendship ties over time. 
 We know that high self-monitors tend to be adaptable and 
ﬂ exible in their self-presentations. But ﬁ ne-grained analyses 
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of expressive self-presentation (Lippa, 1976a, 1976b) have 
shown that the shifting behavior of high self-monitors takes 
place against a consistent background of expressive behavior 
that projects the general appearance of a friendly and outgo-
ing person (see Snyder, 1987: 37). Most social contexts, and 
perhaps especially the workplace (see Argyle, 1992: 78–86), 
require people to project just such an image. The expectation 
that high self-monitors will be more capable of gaining the 
friendship of others is consistent with previous work sug-
gesting that they expend considerable effort in providing 
emotional help (e.g., Toegel, Anand, and Kilduff, 2007) and 
advice (Flynn et al., 2006) to their colleagues. High self-moni-
tors put considerable effort into using a wide repertoire of 
social skills to make their interpersonal interactions go 
smoothly (Ickes et al., 2006). In conversation, they are more 
likely to use the ﬁ rst-person plural pronouns (e.g., we, us, 
our) over the ﬁ rst-person singular (e.g., I, me, mine) (Ickes, 
Reidhead, and Patterson, 1985), convey an immediate sense 
of intimacy (Riggio, Friedman, and DiMatteo, 1981), and 
employ effective conversational pacing (Dabbs et al., 1980) 
and humor (Turner, 1980). The friendly and helpful image that 
high self-monitors project, coupled with their considerable 
social skills, makes it more likely that, relative to their low 
self-monitoring counterparts, high self-monitors will attract 
more new friends over time. 
 Hypothesis 1:  The higher the self-monitoring score, the larger the 
number of new friends an individual will attract over time. 
 Composition.  High self-monitors may gain more friends over 
time, and self-monitoring theory can offer insight into the 
kinds of friends they might attract. Prior work has found that 
demographically different people who are high self-monitors 
appear to be more capable than low self-monitors of discon-
ﬁ rming stereotyped images others may have of them (Flynn, 
Chatman, and Spataro, 2001). By effectively presenting an 
image that disconﬁ rms negative stereotypes of out-group 
members, high self-monitoring individuals may be more 
effective than their low self-monitoring counterparts at 
gaining diverse friends over time. In work organizations, 
formal boundaries can lead members from one function to 
view those belonging to other functions as out-group mem-
bers. Given that behaviors, opinions, and skills tend to vary 
across functional groups (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), it is 
unsurprising that most friendships tend to occur among 
members who belong to the same functional groups (e.g., 
Lincoln and Miller, 1979). The same impression-management 
skills and focus on others that facilitate high self-monitors’ 
ability to disconﬁ rm negative stereotypes, however, should 
lead to their attracting new friends from different functional 
groups over time. 
 It is also possible that high self-monitors are more motivated 
than low self-monitors to actively seek out friends from 
outside their functional groups. Cross-functional coordination 
is both challenging and prized in work organizations (Katz and 
Kahn, 1966). Individuals who are positioned to enhance 
cross-functional coordination stand to gain inﬂ uence and 
status in the organization (Shaw, 1964; Pfeffer, 2010), and 
self-monitoring theory suggests that high self-monitors are 
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especially motivated to elicit status conferrals in their social 
relations (Gangestad and Snyder, 2000; Flynn et al., 2006). 
 Hypothesis 2:  The higher the self-monitoring score, the larger the 
number of new friends an individual will attract from functional 
groups other than his or her own functional group. 
 Pattern.  One can conceptualize network churn not only in 
terms of volume and composition but also in terms of the 
pattern of connections between new ties and previous ones. 
A theory that is often used to explain patterns of network 
change focuses on “structural balance” (Cartwright and 
Harary, 1956; Davis, 1963; Davis and Leinhardt, 1972). 
Expressed in colloquial terms, the gist of this theory is that 
friends of friends tend to become friends. From the perspec-
tive of balance theory, relations tend to be “transitive” 
because people are assumed to have an affective and cogni-
tive preference for transitive structures. Intransitive struc-
tures, in which friends of friends are not friends, are believed 
to produce anxiety and cognitive strain in people (cf. Heider, 
1958) and are therefore less preferred than balanced 
 structures (Jordan, 1953). Investigations have found that the 
evolution of friendship networks appears to follow a pattern 
of increasing transitivity over time (e.g., Newcomb, 1961; van 
de Bunt, 1999; cf. Carley and Krackhardt, 1996; Krackhardt 
and Kilduff, 1999). Given that studies also suggest that 
transitivity can be elusive and unstable in human groups (e.g., 
Doreian et al., 1996), however, it could be that transitivity 
over time is characteristic of the networks of some people 
and not others. 
 Drawing on self-monitoring theory, the traditional logic of 
network growth through transitivity should apply, but only to 
low self-monitors. For high self-monitors, by contrast, 
network growth is more likely to follow a pattern in which 
new friends are relative strangers, in the sense of being 
unconnected to previous friends. The rationale for this 
prediction is grounded in self-monitoring theory and evi-
dence, which suggest that high self-monitors tend to be 
less affectively invested in their friendships than low self-
monitors and are less likely to suffer from cognitive strain 
when their friends are not friends with each other (Snyder 
and Smith, 1986; cf. Caldwell and O’Reilly, 1982). Moreover, 
the superior social skills of high self-monitors may make it 
easier for them to overcome the discomfort that people 
typically feel in interacting with relative strangers. For 
example, in one laboratory study of spontaneous encoun-
ters, researchers arranged for pairs of strangers to spend 
time together in a waiting room (Ickes and Barnes, 1977). 
While the participants ostensibly waited for the experiment 
to begin, researchers surreptitiously recorded the behavior of 
the participants. Results showed that high self-monitors took 
a more active posture in the conversations, talking ﬁ rst and 
initiating subsequent conversation. High self-monitors also 
talked more about the other person than about themselves. 
By taking this active role, high self-monitors were able to 
enhance their ability to inﬂ uence the course of the conversa-
tion and to promote desired images. These social skills, 
combined with the relative lack of cognitive strain they seem 
to experience when their friends are not connected, suggest 
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that the new friends high self-monitors attract are likely to 
be relative strangers. 
 Hypothesis 3:  The higher the self-monitoring score, the less likely 
that an individual’s new friends will have been friends of his or her 
previous friends. 
 A different aspect of network churn involves the dissolution 
of ties. Given high self-monitors’ attentiveness to rules of 
social conduct (cf. Argyle and Henderson, 1984) and the effort 
they put into helping (Flynn et al., 2006) and emotionally 
supporting (Toegel, Anand, and Kilduff, 2007) others, one 
might expect self-monitoring to be negatively related to the 
dissolution of friendship relations. Yet studies also suggest 
that high self-monitors tend to adopt a noncommittal stance 
to their friendship relations (Snyder, Gangestad, and Simpson, 
1983; Gaines et al., 2000), which would lead one to expect 
self-monitoring to be positively related to tie dissolution. 
Given these potentially opposing forces, we did not expect to 
ﬁ nd a straightforward relationship between self-monitoring 
and the dissolution of friendship ties. Nonetheless, in the 
spirit of theory building, we report below the results of 
relevant analyses concerning tie dissolution, although our 
main focus is on brokerage dynamics. 
 Brokerage Dynamics 
 New structural holes.  Organizations are often competitive 
arenas in which information does not spread evenly across 
players. Individuals whose networks are optimized to bridge 
structural holes between people are positioned to reap 
information, control, and vision beneﬁ ts that allow them to 
outperform and outcompete those whose networks contain 
few structural holes (for a summary of evidence, see Burt, 
2010). The performance and career beneﬁ ts of brokerage may 
be an incentive for bridge building, but not everyone has what 
it takes to build bridges (Burt, Jannotta, and Mahoney, 1998). 
There are challenges. For one thing, brokerage opportunities 
are hard to spot: they represent holes in social structure, and 
most people have a tendency to see ties where holes exist 
(Janicik, 1998). For another, it is easier to gain the trust of 
someone who is a friend of a friend than to gain the trust of 
someone whose friends are not one’s friends. But brokers 
have to get people who may not especially like one another to 
like and trust  them . Accomplishing this requires brokers to 
have ﬂ exible identities (Padgett and Ansell, 1993; Reagans 
and Zuckerman, 2008). Thus, although brokerage may be 
proﬁ table, not everyone may be motivated or sufﬁ ciently 
skilled to overcome the interpersonal hurdles to bridge 
building. 
 Prior research has shown that high self-monitors tend to be 
brokers in friendship networks (Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass, 
2001). As in most previous studies, the cross-sectional nature 
of that work precluded investigating the emergence of new 
structural holes and their disappearance over time. An excep-
tion is Burt’s (2002) work on bridge decay. Using four years of 
data on the social networks of bankers, his study showed that 
bridge relations decay quickly: nine in ten bridges in one year 
were gone the next. The rate of decay was slower in the 
networks of bankers who had experience with bridges, a 
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pattern that is consistent with experimental work (Janicik and 
Larrick, 2005) showing that individuals whose networks 
contain bridge relations are able to recognize and capitalize 
on new bridging opportunities more quickly. Social capital, in 
the form of bridging relations, accrues to those who already 
have it (Burt, 2002; for similar results at the level of teams, 
see Zaheer and Soda, 2009). Going beyond, and controlling 
for, this rich-get-richer dynamic, we hypothesize that self- 
monitoring will be positively related to the emergence of new 
holes over time. 
 Hypothesis 4:  The higher a broker’s self-monitoring score, the larger 
the number of new structural holes in his or her network over time. 
 A related implication of these differences in self-monitoring 
has to do with the rate at which new friendship partners add 
to the number of structural holes in an individual’s resultant 
network. The addition of certain people to a friendship 
network adds more to the number of structural holes in the 
resultant network than the addition of other people to the 
network. The extent to which a new friend adds to the 
number of holes in the resultant network is greater if the 
person added is (a) unconnected to others who are added and 
(b) is relatively unconnected to others in the resultant net-
work. We have explained above the reasons that high self-
monitors may be more motivated and skilled at acquiring new 
structural holes than low self-monitors. If the new friends 
high self-monitors attract remain unconnected to their other 
friends, they will allow for more efﬁ cient expansion of the 
possibilities for network brokerage (see Burt, 1992: 20–21). 
The number of structural holes that are added to a network as 
a result of the addition of each new friend should be greater 
for high self-monitors than for low self-monitors. 
 Hypothesis 5:  The higher a broker’s self-monitoring score, the high-
er the rate at which the addition of new friends adds to the  number 
of structural holes in the resultant network. 
 Dynamics of existing holes.  Self-monitoring may be related 
not only to the emergence of new holes over time but also to 
brokerage dynamics with respect to existing holes, as shown 
in  ﬁ gure 1 . Imagine that at time 1 person A is a broker in the 
sense that A is considered a friend by B and C, who are not 
themselves friends. In addition to the possibility of developing 
new holes at time 2, this existing hole could remain 
unchanged at time 2 (same hole), or the hole could close at 
time 2 because of the emergence of a direct relationship 
between B and C. 
 The ﬁ rst two brokerage dynamics—the formation of new 
brokerage positions and the retention of existing ones—are 
consistent with the  tertius gaudens (“the third who enjoys”) 
strategy at the heart of structural hole theory (Burt, 1992, 
2005). This theory suggests that brokers beneﬁ t by retaining 
or obtaining positions in which they connect otherwise 
unconnected others, as such positions offer the potential for 
superior access to information and greater opportunities for 
control. The last brokerage dynamic, the closing of structural 
holes, is more consistent with the contrasting  tertius iungens 
(“the third who connects”) strategy (Obstfeld, 2005). In this 
Network Churn
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scenario, the broker beneﬁ ts by closing the gap between 
previously disconnected others by bringing them into direct 
contact. 
 Brokerage dynamics should follow the  tertius gaudens pattern 
or the contrasting  tertius iungens pattern depending on the 
self-monitoring orientation of the broker. People are attracted 
to network structures that are congruent with their disposi-
tions (Snyder and Gangestad, 1982). Dispositionally congruent 
network structures are more likely to provide opportunities for 
the manifestation and reinforcement of dispositional prefer-
ences. Brokerage positions in friendship networks require 
incumbents to ﬂ exibly adapt to the expectations of people 
who are not themselves friends, and self-monitoring theory 
and evidence suggest that high self-monitors are more skilled 
at managing diverse role expectations than low self-monitors 
(e.g., Caldwell and O’Reilly, 1982; cf. Flynn, Chatman, and 
Spataro, 2001). 
 In addition, brokerage positions may be ideally suited to the 
preference of high self-monitors for “audience segregation” 
(Goffman, 1959), which refers to efforts to insure that those 
individuals to whom high self-monitors have presented one 
image do not get to see them presenting a potentially incon-
gruent image to others. The segmentation of friendship 
relations that is characteristic of brokerage facilitates the high 
self-monitors’ interpersonal tendency to assume different 
identities with different people. Brokerage positions therefore 
may help preserve the credibility of high self-monitors’ social 
 Figure 1.  Three types of brokerage dynamics. 
Note: Each node represents a person. A directed line from B to A represents a friendship tie from B to A. 
Non-directed ties between B and C imply that there is a friendship tie from C to B, a friendship tie from B to C, 
or both.
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performances (cf. Snyder, 1987: 64). To the extent that high 
self-monitors prefer to have different friends for different 
occasions (Snyder, Gangestad, and Simpson, 1983), they may 
also be unmotivated to bring their friends together. 
 The implications of these skill-based and motivational differ-
ences in self-monitoring for brokerage dynamics seem clear. 
We expect that high self-monitors will be more likely than low 
self-monitors to maintain the brokerage positions they occupy 
and less likely to close structural holes over time. 
 Hypothesis 6a:  The higher a broker’s self-monitoring score, the 
more likely that structural holes are maintained over time. 
 Hypothesis 6b:  The higher a broker’s self-monitoring score, the less 
likely that structural holes are closed over time. 
 METHODS 
 Research Setting 
 Data for our study were collected at the radiology department 
of a hospital located in the south of the Netherlands. The 
study included all 170 employees of the radiology depart-
ment. The occupational structure and roles of members of a 
radiology department have been detailed in previous research 
(e.g., Barley, 1986; Black, Carlile, and Repenning, 2004). 
Administrative personnel were responsible for making 
appointments with patients, managing an archive of patient 
records, and typing diagnostic ﬁ ndings. Technologists exe-
cuted examinations, such as taking an X-ray. Radiologists 
interpreted results of examinations, determined a diagnosis, 
and, in close cooperation with technologists, executed several 
types of advanced examination, such as angiography or 
magnetic resonance imaging. 
 Given our interest in the dynamics of friendship networks, we 
collected data during a period when the organization was 
undergoing change, speciﬁ cally, adoption of a new informa-
tion processing system. Prior work has shown that such 
changes provide a window of opportunity for observing the 
restructuring of social network ties (e.g., Barley, 1986; 
Burkhardt and Brass, 1990; cf. Tyre and Orlikowski, 1994). 
Studying friendship dynamics in the absence of such change 
would probably have required us to study network change 
over a longer time scale than the nine months over which we 
examined network dynamics. Our research design therefore 
took advantage of a technologically induced “jolt” to study 
how personality shapes the dynamics of social networks (cf. 
Meyer, 1982). 
 The organization we studied was in the process of imple-
menting new information technology, consisting of a picture 
archiving and communication system (PACS) and a radiology 
information system (RIS). The RIS is used to schedule 
appointments and record a patient’s information as a patient 
moves through the primary work process of the department. 
RIS also includes a speech recognition system that forms the 
basis for a digital recording of the ﬁ ndings of an examination 
in a ﬁ nal report. The PACS allows for digital recording, editing, 
archiving, and access to images. Analyses (available from the 
authors) indicated that network churn was broadly spread 
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across different functions as opposed to being concentrated 
in any one function. 
 Sample 
 We conducted a paper-and-pencil sociometric survey at the 
radiology department at two different times. The ﬁ rst survey 
took place approximately three months before the implemen-
tation of the new information system (T1). It was adminis-
tered to all 163 employees (48 men and 115 women). The 
second questionnaire was administered nine months later 
(T2) to all 162 employees (47 men and 115 women) of the 
department, including the full range of functions. At T1, there 
were 12 radiologists, 7 radiology assistants, 84 technologists, 
22 technology assistants, and 38 members of the administra-
tive staff. At T2, the functional composition of the respon-
dents was similar, with 12 radiologists, 8 radiology assistants, 
89 technologists, 19 technology assistants, and 34 members 
of the administrative staff. Over the period of nine months 
between T1 and T2, eight respondents left and seven respon-
dents joined the department; these respondents were 
removed from the longitudinal analyses. 
 Data on gender, function, and tenure came from departmen-
tal records. We gathered data on self-monitoring as part of 
the ﬁ rst survey for each participant. We received 163 
responses to the self-monitoring measure (96 percent). In 
total, 142 individuals responded to the sociometric question 
at T1 (response rate: 87.7 percent) and 139 at T2 (response 
rate: 85.8 percent). The effective size of the ﬁ nal dataset 
varied between 123 and 155, depending on the type of 
analysis. Non-respondents did not signiﬁ cantly differ from 
respondents with respect to age, gender, function, rank, 
tenure, or performance. 
 Measures 
 Self-monitoring.  Self-monitoring was measured at T1 using a 
Dutch language version of the 18-item revised Self-Monitoring 
Scale (Gangestad and Snyder, 1985; Snyder and Gangestad, 
1986; translation validated by Vinkenburg, 1997). Items 
include “I would probably make a good actor,” and “I have 
trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and 
different situations” (reverse coded). Snyder and Gangestad 
(1986) argued that the revised scale was more reliable and 
factorially pure than the original 25-item scale, described in 
Snyder (1974). We used a response format based on a 5-point 
Likert scale because a meta-analysis of self-monitoring at 
work (Day et al., 2002) showed that this scale format was 
more reliable than the original true-false scoring format. We 
followed the standard practice in using the average score on 
the scale to code self-monitoring. Cronbach’s alpha for the 
scale in our study was .77. 
 Friendship network.  We asked each respondent to look 
down an alphabetical list of fellow employees and check the 
names of the people whom he or she considered “a per-
sonal friend, e.g., a person you like to spend breaks with, or 
with whom you like to take part in different social activities.” 
A validation study conducted at a dialysis and nursing 
department of a Dutch hospital showed that this question 
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reliably distinguishes a “friendly relationship” from a 
“friend” (van de Bunt, 1999: 97). Friendship, in comparison 
to friendly relationships, includes ties that are more intimate, 
voluntary, and unique (van de Bunt, van Duijn, and Snijders, 
1999). The question was translated (and back-translated) 
from English to Dutch by three independent translators and 
pre-tested for face validity and acceptability at a different 
radiology department. 
 The data on friendship relations were arranged in a 142 x 142 
binary adjacency matrix at T1 and 139 x 139 binary adja-
cency matrix at T2. In each matrix, a value of 1 in the cell 
 x ij corresponded to  i nominating  j as a friend. A value of 0 
indicated no relation from  i to  j . The ﬁ rst matrix contained 
20,022 observations on all possible pairs of people at T1, and 
the second matrix contained 19,182 observations on all 
possible pairs of people at T2. To calculate the network 
indexes and brokerage measures, we used the network 
software program UCINET VI, version 6.289 (Borgatti, 
Everett, and Freeman, 2002). The density of the friendship 
network at both points in time was .12. 
 Volume of network churn.  We assessed the volume of 
network churn by counting, for each person in our sample, 
(1) the number of new ties that emerged between T1 and T2 
(i.e., ties that existed at T2 but not at T1) and (2) the number 
of ties that dissolved between T1 and T2 (i.e., ties that 
existed at T1 but not at T2). Self-monitoring is primarily a 
theory of the impressions individuals create in the eyes of 
others, so we focused on incoming friendship ties. Because 
self-monitoring was self-reported, reliance on out-going 
friendship ties would also have inﬂ ated the likelihood of 
spurious results. 
 Composition of network churn .  We examined the composi-
tion of network churn by counting the number of new friends 
who came from a different functional group within the 
department than the focal respondent. 
 Pattern of network churn.  To assess the pattern of network 
churn, we used the “egonet change” routine available in the 
social network software package UCINET VI (version 6.289). 
This routine assesses the degree of connectedness between 
an individual’s new friends and the individual’s previous 
friends. We used the routine to calculate, for each individual 
in our sample, the proportion of ego’s new friends who were 
friends with ego’s friends at T1. We then divided this number 
by the maximum number of such ties that was possible, 
given the number of friends ego possessed at T1 and the 
number of friends added at T2. The resulting measure can 
vary between zero and one. 
 Network brokerage .  To assess brokerage in the friendship 
network, we used the “honest broker index” in UCINET VI 
(version 6.289). This index reﬂ ects the frequency with which 
a node directly connects pairs of nodes that are not them-
selves directly connected. We focused on brokerage at the 
local, triadic level rather than using more global measures of 
brokerage, such as betweenness centrality that take long 
chains of indirect relations into account (see Freeman, 1979), 
because the effects of personality on network change are 
Network Churn
651/ASQ, December 2010
most likely to be concentrated in the network immediately 
surrounding the focal individual. Individuals are more likely to 
be able to inﬂ uence their proximal ties rather than their distant 
ones, which may also be one reason that the performance 
beneﬁ ts of network brokerage appear to be concentrated in 
the immediate network surrounding the individual (see Burt, 
2010). 
 To compute the extent to which person A is a broker, the 
measure counts the number of times A is part of a triad such 
that (1) B reports a friendship tie to A, (2) C reports a friend-
ship tie to A, and (3) neither B nor C report a friendship tie to 
each other. The three conditions above were minimum 
criteria that had to be satisﬁ ed for A to be considered as a 
broker. Our measure permitted triads in which these mini-
mum conditions were met but in which A also had a tie to B 
and/or C. Thus, consistent with our approach to measuring 
network churn, our measure of network brokerage focused 
on incoming friendship ties as a necessary condition for the 
establishment of brokerage relationships. As a test of robust-
ness, we also computed an alternative measure of brokerage, 
“ego betweenness,” which was computed as the sum of the 
proportion of times ego lies on the shortest path between 
each pair of alters (Everett and Borgatti, 2005). The pattern of 
results was unchanged. 
 Brokerage dynamics.  To assess brokerage dynamics, we 
ﬁ rst calculated the number of brokerage positions that 
remained unchanged between T1 and T2 ( same holes ). That 
is, we calculated the number of times A occupied a brokerage 
position between the same pair (B and C) at both T1 and T2. 
Second, we counted the number of brokerage positions that 
were  closed holes between T1 and T2. We considered a 
brokerage position to have been closed over time if A occu-
pied a brokerage position between B and C at T1, but at T2 
there was either a friendship tie from B to C or a friendship tie 
from C to B or both. Third, we calculated the number of new 
brokerage positions ( new holes ) that were formed at T2. 
These are structural holes in which at T2 a person A brokers 
between a different pair of alters than at T1. We computed 
this measure by subtracting the number of same holes 
between T1 and T2 from the number of structural holes 
counted at T2. The Appendix provides more details on the 
matrix algebra behind how these measures of brokerage 
dynamics were calculated. 1 
 New holes per new friend.  To examine the rate at which new 
friends increase the number of holes in the resultant network, 
we constructed an additional measure related to brokerage 
dynamics:  new holes per new friend . This measure reﬂ ects 
the average number of structural holes that a person added to 
his or her network for each new friend he or she gained 
between T1 and T2. 
 Control Variables 
 Gender.  We controlled for gender because prior research has 
shown that it inﬂ uences the structure of social networks in 
work organizations (e.g., Brass, 1985; Ibarra, 1992). The 
variable gender was coded as 0 for males and as 1 for 
females. 
 1 
 We considered and ruled out the possible 
effects of “opened holes” on our results. 
Imagine that at T1, A was considered a 
friend by both B and C and that there was 
a friendship relation between B and C. 
This closed hole would become an open 
hole if the friendship relation between B 
and C were to disappear at T2. This 
dynamic is the temporal opposite of that 
described as “closed holes.” We 
conducted a sensitivity analysis in which 
we counted the number of opened holes 
and subtracted this number from our 
current measure of new holes. Analyses 
using this “puriﬁ ed” measure of new 
holes yielded results that were consistent 
with those reported in  table 6 , below. 
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 Function .  We controlled for job function because of its likely 
inﬂ uence on friendship relations. Functional afﬁ liation can be 
seen as a proxy for workﬂ ow in the radiology department. We 
coded function as 1 = radiologist, 2 = radiology assistant, 3 = 
technologist, 4 = technology assistant, and 5 = administrative 
staff. We treated function as a categorical variable in the 
regression analyses and created four dummy variables to 
differentiate between functional groups. This allowed us to 
account for the possible effects of function-speciﬁ c character-
istics, such as group size. 
 Tenure.  The longer a person’s tenure, the more opportunities 
he or she has had for interaction with other colleagues and 
developing relationships (e.g., van de Bunt, 1999). It is also 
possible that individuals with longer tenure may be less likely 
to have structural holes in their networks than individuals with 
shorter tenures. We coded tenure as the length of time, in 
years, that a respondent had been an employee of the 
radiology department. 
 Performance.  Prior individual work performance may be 
related to the amount of network churn and brokerage 
dynamics.  For instance, Burt (2002) has shown that high-
performance bankers experienced less decay in their bridge 
and non-bridge relations (fewer lost ties), and they were more 
likely to acquire new bridge relations. We assessed job perfor-
mance using supervisory ratings based on a 4-item scale. 
Three of the scale items were adapted from Tsui et al. (1997), 
and the fourth was adapted from Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass 
(2001). The reliability of the scale was .93 (scale items are 
available upon request). 
 Analyses 
 For analyses with interval-scaled dependent variables (e.g., 
average number of new structural holes per new friend), we 
used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. In most of our 
analyses, the dependent variables are count variables (e.g., 
the number of new friends, the number of times a person 
occupies a brokerage position). Because OLS is inappropriate 
in these cases, we used the negative binomial model, which 
is designed speciﬁ cally for the analysis of count variables 
(Greene, 1997). The negative binomial model is a generaliza-
tion of a Poisson model that accounts for the overdispersion 
(variance exceeding the mean) present in our data (cf. Barron, 
1992; Hausman, Hall, and Griliches, 1984). The dependent 
variable in our analysis predicting the pattern of network 
churn is expressed as a proportion so that its values vary 
between zero and one. For analysis involving this dependent 
variable, we used the fractional logit regression model 
proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). 
 RESULTS 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 presents means, standard deviations, and zero-order 
correlations. Men made up 28 percent of the sample at both 
time periods. The composition of the sample by function 
changed only slightly between T1 and T2: at T1, there were 
12 radiologists (7.4 percent), 7 radiology assistants (4.3 
percent), 84 technologists (51.5 percent), 22 technology 
Network Churn
653/ASQ, December 2010
 Table 1 
 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 Variable  Mean  S.D.  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 1. Gender (0 = male) – –
 2. Function – – .24 •• 
 3. Tenure 12.29 9.20 .08 –.14
 4. Performance T1 3.53 0.80 .15 .30 •• –.02
 5. Self-monitoring 2.32 0.49 –.38 •• –.14 –.26 •• –.07
 6. Brokerage T1 61.53 57.77 .04 .07 .00 .19 • .23 •• 
 7. Network size T1 16.94 7.36 .06 .11 .09 .26 •• .16 • .85 •• 
 8. Brokerage T2 60.76 58.03 .02 .08 –.03 .24 •• .21 •• .67 •• .76 •• 
 9. New friends 6.09 3.94 .09 .03 –.22 •• .17 •• .22 •• .45 •• .47 •• .74 •• 
10. Lost friends 7.15 3.83 –.08 .01 .04 .11 .18 • .71 •• .80 •• .51 •• 
11.  New friends from 
different functions
3.15 2.73 .01 .11 –.32 •• .11 .26 •• .34 •• .33 •• .59 •• 
12. Pattern of churn 0.33 0.15 .15 .07 –.14 –.05 –.23 •• –.28 •• –.27 •• –.17
13. Same holes 10.95 12.53 –.03 .06 –.02 .21 • .20 • .66 •• .75 •• .77 •• 
14. Closed holes 5.32 6.36 –.10 .00 –.10 .10 .19 • .65 •• .75 •• .68 •• 
15. New holes 46.06 43.30 .07 .12 –.12 .25 •• .22 • .63 •• .69 •• .91 •• 
16.  New holes per 
new friend
4.96 2.92 .10 .13 .06 .28 •• .20 • .68 •• .77 •• .87 •• 
 Variable  9  10  11  12  13  14  15 
10. Lost friends .42 •• 
11.  New friends from 
different functions
.82 •• .31 •• 
12. Pattern of churn –.01 –.32 •• –.17
13. Same holes .31 •• .40 •• .18 • –.16
14. Closed holes .35 •• .48 •• .26 •• –.15 .78 •• 
15. New holes .83 •• .48 •• .67 •• –.17 .67 •• .66 •• 
16.  New holes per 
new friend
.62 •• .48 •• .45 •• –.32 •• .75 •• .66 •• .89 •• 
 • p < .05;  ••  p < .01; two-tailed tests.
assistants (13.5 percent), and 38 members of the administra-
tive staff (23.3 percent). At T2, there were 12 radiologists (7.4 
percent), 8 radiology assistants (4.9 percent), 89 technologists 
(54.9 percent), 19 technology assistants (11.7 percent), and 
34 members of the administrative staff (21 percent). 
 We used ANOVA to analyze the relation between self- 
monitoring and function. None of the multiple comparisons 
in the post-hoc analyses showed a statistically signiﬁ cant 
difference in self-monitoring score between functions. On 
average, respondents had been with the department for just 
over twelve years. 
 Over the nine-month period spanned by our study, there was 
clear evidence of both considerable network stability at the 
level of the overall network structures and considerable churn 
at the level of individual ties. The results of correlation analy-
ses in UCINET VI—which correct for autocorrelation present 
in network data by assessing signiﬁ cance using the Quadratic 
Assignment Procedure (QAP)—showed that there was a 
reasonable degree of stability at the overall network level 
between T1 and T2: a non-parametric measure of association 
(Goodman-Kruskal Gamma) between the friendship adjacency 
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matrix at T1 and the friendship adjacency matrix at T2 was .91 
( p < .001). The Pearson correlation coefﬁ cient also suggested 
moderate to high levels of association between T1 and T2 ( r = 
.52;  p < .001). Yet beneath this apparent stability there was 
evidence of network churn. Of a total of 2,690 ties at T1, 
1,459 were “stable,” in the sense that they existed at T1 and 
still existed at T2; 1,160 new ties were “created” by T2 that 
did not exist at T1; and 1,231 ties that existed at T1 were 
“lost” by T2. This rate of churn in friendship ties is compa-
rable to that reported by van de Bunt (1999: 127) in his study 
of network changes in a dialysis department over a period of 
approximately one year. 
 Network Churn 
 Volume.  Hypothesis 1 predicted a greater volume of network 
churn in the social networks of high self-monitors than in the 
social networks of low self-monitors. The results of the 
negative binomial regressions presented in  table 2 show 
support for this hypothesis. Controlling for gender, function, 
tenure, and performance, the results indicate that the friend-
ship networks of high self-monitors (relative to those of low 
self-monitors) exhibited a greater volume of network churn. 
As shown in models 1 and 3 of  table 2 , self-monitoring was 
positively related to both the formation of new friendship 
ties ( p < .01) and their loss ( p < .05). In both cases, adding 
 Table 2 
 Results of Negative Binomial Regression Predicting Self-Monitoring Differences in the Volume of Network 
Churn (N = 147)* 
 New Friends  Lost Friends 
 Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Gender .08
(.10)
.13
(.10)
–.19 
(.11)
–.00 
(.07)
Function = 1 –.25
(.26)
–.11
(.26)
–.44 
(.23)
.06 
(.17)
Function = 2 .30
(.23)
.41
(.23)
–.34 
(.24)
.06 
(.18)
Function = 3 .64 ••• 
(.11)
.55 ••• 
(.12)
.26 • 
(.11)
–.04 
(.08)
Function = 4 1.14 ••• 
(.14)
1.05 ••• 
(.14)
.21 
(.15)
–.12 
(.11)
Tenure –.00
(.01)
-.00 
(.01)
.01 
(.01)
.00 
(.00)
Performance T1 .12 • 
(.06)
.07 
(.06)
.05 
(.06)
–.06 
(.04)
Self-monitoring .27 •• 
(.09)
.22 • 
(.09)
.21 • 
(.09)
.01 
(.06)
Network size T1 .02 •• 
(.01)
.06 ••• 
(.00)
Pearson χ 2 152.77 146.99 143.62 141.27
Log likelihood 860.63 865.37 1079.13 1139.06
Likelihood ratio test † 4.67 •• 4.75 •• 2.47 • 59.93 ••• 
 •  p < .05;  ••  p < .01;  •••  p < .001.
 * Entries represent parameter estimates; standard errors are in parentheses. The intercept and dispersion parameters 
were included in the negative binomial regression models but are not reported here.
 † A likelihood ratio test compares the goodness of ﬁ t of a model with the previous nested model. Models 1 and 3 
reported here are compared with the models with control variables (gender, function, tenure, and performance).
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self-monitoring to the regression signiﬁ cantly improved overall 
model ﬁ t, as indicated by the results of the likelihood ratio 
(LR) test. 2 
 We also checked to see if the relationship between self- 
monitoring and the volume of network churn would be 
signiﬁ cant after controlling for the initial size of each 
person’s friendship network. We included network size as a 
control variable because the size of an individual’s network 
at T1 should be positively related to both the number of 
new friends an individual gains over time (the familiar 
“rich-get-richer” dynamic underlying preferential attach-
ment models—e.g., Merton, 1968) and the number of 
friends an individual loses over time (the larger the net-
work, the greater the likelihood of tie loss through random 
attrition). The results presented in model 2 of  table 2 show 
that the relation between self-monitoring and the appear-
ance of new friendship ties remained signiﬁ cant even after 
controlling for network size at T1 ( p < .05). By contrast, the 
relation between self-monitoring and the number of lost 
ties was not statistically signiﬁ cant after including network 
size at T1 in model 4. This pattern of results suggests that 
high self-monitors were forming more new friendship ties 
over time than low self-monitors, and this was not just 
because high self-monitors initially had more friends. 3 The 
greater number of friendships “lost” by high self-monitors 
was because they initially had larger friendship networks. 4 
 Composition.  Our second hypothesis predicted that self-
monitoring is positively related to the tendency to attract 
friends from different functions over time. As the results of 
negative binomial regressions presented in  table 3 show, 
self-monitoring was positively related to the number of new 
friends who came from functions other than that of the focal 
individual ( p < .01 in model 1). Not surprisingly, the size of an 
individual’s network at T1 was a signiﬁ cant predictor of the 
number of new friends from different functions an individual 
gained by T2 ( p < .001 in model 2). But controlling for the 
effects of network size, self-monitoring remained positively 
related to the tendency of new friends to come from func-
tions different from that of the focal individual ( p < .05 in 
model 2). These results support hypothesis 2. 
 Pattern.  Hypothesis 3 predicted that self-monitoring would 
be negatively related to the tendency of new friends to be 
connected to ego’s previous friends. The results of the 
fractional logit regression analysis presented in  table 4 
support this hypothesis. Controlling for gender, function, 
tenure, and performance, the results indicate that self-
monitoring was negatively  related to the tendency of ego’s 
new friends to have been connected with ego’s previous 
friends ( p < .001). Whereas the new friends that low 
self-monitors attracted tended to be friends of their previ-
ous friends (the familiar dynamic of network evolution 
through transitivity), the new friends that high self-monitors 
attracted tended to be relative strangers in the sense that 
they tended to be unconnected with their previous friends. 
Note that the dependent variable in this analysis is condi-
tioned by network size at T1 because it is expressed as a 
density. 
 2 
 We used the likelihood ratio (LR) tests to 
statistically assess an improvement of the 
goodness of ﬁ t of our hierarchically 
nested models. Adding additional 
parameters to a baseline model that 
includes only control variables (gender, 
function, tenure, and performance) always 
results in a higher likelihood score. The LR 
test allows us to test whether adding an 
additional parameter (e.g., self-monitoring 
score) is justiﬁ ed in terms of a signiﬁ cant 
improvement in model ﬁ t (cf. Huelsen-
beck and Rannala, 1997). 
 3 
 The size of the reported coefﬁ cients in 
negative binomial regressions can be 
interpreted as the effect of the variable on 
the logarithm of the dependent (count) 
variable. Thus controlling for gender, 
function, tenure, performance at T1, and 
network size at T1 in model 2 of  table 2 , a 
one-unit increase in self-monitoring score 
is related to a higher number of new 
friends by approximately 25 percent [exp 
(.22)]. In this sample, self-monitoring has a 
mean of 2.32 and a standard deviation of 
.49 (see  table 1 ). A person with an 
average self-monitoring score of 2.8 is 
expected to have approximately 12.5 
percent more new friends than a person 
with a self-monitoring score of 2.3. 
 4 
 In a supplementary analysis, we 
computed a composite measure that 
captured “network expansion” (new 
friends – lost friends) relative to “overall 
churn” (new friends + lost friends). 
Controlling for gender, function, tenure, 
performance, and network size at T1, 
self-monitoring was positively related to 
this composite measure of network churn 
(p < .01). 
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 Table 4 
 Results of Fractional Logit Regression Predicting Self-Monitoring Differences in the Pattern of Network Churn 
(N = 124)* 
 Variable  Pattern of network churn 
Gender –.02 
(.16)
Function = 1 –.52 
(.35)
Function = 2 –.18 
(.39)
Function = 3 .11 
(.21)
Function = 4 –.05 
(.23)
Tenure –.02 •• 
(.01)
Performance T1 –.14 
(.09)
Self-monitoring –.41 ••• 
(.11)
Pearson χ 2 10.03
Log pseudolikelihood 53.85
 •  p < .05;  ••  p < .01;  •••  p < .001.
 * Entries represent parameter estimates; standard errors are in parentheses. The intercept was included in the 
 fractional regression model but is not reported here.
 Table 3 
 Results of Negative Binomial Regression Predicting Compositional Effects in Network Churn (N = 155)* 
 New Friends from Different Functions 
 Variable  Model 1  Model 2 
Gender .24 
(.15)
.30 • 
(.14)
Function = 1 .04 
(.31)
.30 
(.31)
Function = 2 .21 
(.28)
.44 
(.27)
Function = 3 –.04 
(.15)
–.21 
(.15)
Function = 4 .77 ••• 
(.18)
.60 ••• 
(.18)
Tenure –.01 
(.01)
–.02 • 
(.01)
Performance T1 .07 
(.08)
–.01 
(.08)
Self-monitoring .36 •• 
(.13)
.25 • 
(.12)
Network size T1 .04 ••• 
(.01)
Pearson χ 2 140.75 137.20
Log likelihood 162.60 170.90
Likelihood ratio test † 3.94 •• 8.31 ••• 
 •  p < .05;  ••  p < .01;  •••  p < .001.
 * Entries represent parameter estimates; standard errors are in parentheses. The intercept and dispersion parameters 
were included in the negative binomial regression models but are not reported here.
 † A likelihood ratio test compares the goodness of ﬁ t of a model with the previous nested model. Model 1 is 
 compared with the model with control variables (gender, function, tenure, and performance).
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 Brokerage Dynamics 
 Previous cross-sectional work has shown that high self-moni-
tors tend to be brokers in friendship networks (Mehra, Kilduff, 
and Brass, 2001). The results presented in  table 5 show that 
this was also true for our sample. The addition of self-moni-
toring signiﬁ cantly improved overall model ﬁ t (compared with 
the model including only the control variables) at both T1 and 
T2, as indicated by the results of the LR test ( p < .001 for T1 
and  p < .01 for T2). Controlling for gender, function, tenure, 
and performance, self-monitoring was positively related to 
occupying brokerage positions in the friendship network at 
both T1 ( p < .001) and T2 ( p < .01). 5 
 New holes.  High self-monitors may have been more likely to 
occupy brokerage positions in the friendship network at both 
time periods (i.e., both before and after the implementation of 
the new information system), but we wanted to determine if 
they occupied new brokerage positions over time. The results 
of the negative binomial regressions presented in  table 6 show 
that, controlling for gender, function, tenure, and performance, 
high self-monitors were more likely than low self-monitors to 
occupy new holes ( p < .001 in model 1). Adding self-monitoring 
to this regression model improved overall model ﬁ t, as indi-
cated by the signiﬁ cance of the LR test. 
 The number of structural holes occupied by an individual at T2 
should be positively related to the number of structural holes 
the individual occupied at T1, because experience with 
managing brokerage is likely to inﬂ uence the extent to which 
individuals are subsequently able to observe, maintain, and ﬁ ll 
 Table 5 
 Results of Negative Binomial Regression Predicting Brokerage in the Friendship Network at T1 and T2* 
 Variable  Brokerage at T1 (N = 154)  Brokerage at T2 (N = 149) 
Gender .02 
(.19)
–.04 
(.19)
Function = 1 –.65 
(.37)
–.64 
(.38)
Function = 2 –.41 
(.39)
–.61 
(.36)
Function = 3 .46 • 
(.18)
.64 ••• 
(.18)
Function = 4 .86 ••• 
(.25)
1.17 ••• 
(.26)
Tenure .01 
(.01)
.01 
(.01)
Performance T1 .16 
(.10)
.29 •• 
(.10)
Self-monitoring .59 ••• 
(.17)
.52 •• 
(.16)
Pearson χ 2 136.51 177.12
Log likelihood 34620.01 33687.16
Likelihood ratio test † 6.05 ••• 5.11 •• 
 •  p < .05;  ••  p < .01;  •••  p < .001.
 * Entries represent parameter estimates; standard errors are in parentheses. The intercept and dispersion parameters 
were included in the negative binomial regression models but are not reported here.
 † The likelihood ratio test compares the goodness of ﬁ t of the two reported models with respective models with 
control variables (gender, function, tenure, and performance).
 5 
 The coefﬁ cients for self-monitoring in 
models 1 and 2 of  table 5 indicate that, 
controlling for gender, function, tenure, 
and performance at T1, an increase of one 
standard deviation in the self-monitoring 
score is related to an increase in the 
number of brokerage positions of 
approximately 40 percent [exp (.59) = 1.8] 
at T1 and a 34 percent [exp (.52) = 1.68] 
increase in the number of brokerage 
positions at T2. 
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new brokerage opportunities (Burt, 2002; Janicik and Larrick, 
2005). To control for these structural effects, we included the 
number of structural holes occupied by a person at T1 as an 
additional control in  table 6 , model 2. The results show that 
the number of structural holes a person occupied at T1 was a 
signiﬁ cant predictor of new holes at T2 ( p < .001). But even 
after controlling for these signiﬁ cant structural effects, 
self-monitoring was a signiﬁ cant predictor of the number of 
new brokerage positions that emerged in an individual’s 
network over time ( p < .05 in model 2). Thus even controlling 
for the effects of structural opportunity and possible learning 
beneﬁ ts that may arise from occupying bridging positions, 
high self-monitors were more likely than low self-monitors to 
occupy new structural holes over time. 6 These results provide 
strong support for hypothesis 4. 
 Hypothesis 5 predicted that self-monitoring would be posi-
tively related to the rate of formation of new structural holes 
through gaining new friends. The results of OLS regressions 
presented in  table 7 , model 1 show that controlling for 
gender, function, tenure, and performance, self-monitoring is 
signiﬁ cantly and positively related to our measure of new 
holes per new friend ( p < .001). Self-monitoring in model 1 
explains an additional 7 percent of the variance in the number 
of new holes per new friend in comparison to the model 
 6 
 Controlling for gender, function, tenure, 
performance at T1, and brokerage at T1 in 
model 2 of  table 6 , a one-standard- 
deviation increase in self-monitoring score 
is related to approximately a 21 percent 
higher number of new structural holes 
[exp (.35) = 1.42]. 
 Table 6 
 Results of Negative Binomial Regression Predicting Brokerage Dynamics in the Friendship  Network (N = 124)* 
 New Holes  Same Holes  Closed Holes 
 Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Gender .03 
(.19)
–.01 
(.16)
–.38 
(.29)
–.45 
(.24)
−.46 
(.26)
–.57 •• 
(.22)
Function = 1 –.78 
(.42)
–.63 
(.37)
−.53 
(.63)
.07 
(.54)
−.62 
(.62)
–.17 
(.55)
Function = 2 –.47 
(.38)
−.25 
(.33)
–1.06 
(.60)
–.62 
(.51)
−.21 
(.54)
.24 
(.47)
Function = 3 .74 ••• 
(.20)
.73 ••• 
(.17)
.63 • 
(.30)
.82 •• 
(.26)
1.13 ••• 
(.29)
1.10 ••• 
(.26)
Function = 4 1.41 ••• 
(.26)
1.20 ••• 
(.23)
.98 • 
(.41)
.33 
(.35)
1.61 ••• 
(.37)
1.14 ••• 
(.32)
Tenure .01 
(.01)
.00 
(.01)
.01 
(.01)
–.00 
(.01)
.00 
(.01)
–.00 
(.01)
Performance T1 .27 • 
(.11)
.21 • 
(.10)
.34 • 
(.17)
.36 • 
(.15)
.13 
(.14)
.11 
(.13)
Self-monitoring .55 ••• 
(.16)
.35 • 
(.14)
.51 • 
(.25)
.07 
(.21)
.47 
(.24)
.13 
(.20)
Brokerage T1 .01 ••• 
(.00)
.01 ••• 
(.00)
.01 ••• 
(.00)
Pearson χ 2 155.38 154.46 105.95 132.36 130.15 129.09
Log likelihood 18365.34 18384.64 2530.78 2552.35 711.94 734.28
Likelihood ratio 
test † 
5.52 ••• 19.30 ••• 2.08 • 21.57 ••• 1.90 22.35 ••• 
 •  p < .05;  ••  p < .01;  •••  p < .001.
 * Entries represent parameter estimates; standard errors are in parentheses. The intercept and dispersion parameters 
were included in the negative binomial regression models but are not reported here.
 † A likelihood ratio test compares the goodness of ﬁ t of a model with the previous nested model. Models 1, 3, and 5 
are compared with the models with control variables (gender, function, tenure, and performance).
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containing only control variables. The results in model 2 of 
 table 7 show that the relationship between self-monitoring 
and the rate at which new holes were formed remained 
signiﬁ cant ( p < .01) even after we controlled for the positive 
effects of network size on our dependent variable. 7 These 
results support hypothesis 5. 
 Dynamics of existing holes.  Hypotheses 6a and 6b pre-
dicted the effects of self-monitoring on brokerage dynamics 
for existing holes. We theorized that high self-monitors will 
tend to occupy the same brokerage positions over time and 
their structural holes are less likely to close. In total we 
identiﬁ ed 10,275 structural holes at T1 and 9,904 structural 
holes at T2. The average person occupied 62 such holes in 
the friendship network at T1 and almost 61 at T2. Despite the 
relatively high correlation between our measures of broker-
age at T1 and at T2 ( r = .67;  p < .01), only 1,369 structural 
holes were stable. This survival rate of 13.3 percent is 
comparable to the 10 percent survival rate reported in Burt 
(2002). Over the nine-month course of the study, 767 of the 
structural holes at T1 were closed by T2, and 8,535 holes that 
did not exist at T1 appeared at T2. Although the number of 
structural holes in the network was about the same over the 
nine months spanned by our study, these numbers clearly 
 7 
 The coefﬁ cient of self-monitoring in model 
2 of  table 7 is equal to 1; hence a one-unit 
increase in a respondent’s score on the 
self-monitoring scale was expected to 
lead to one additional structural hole 
formed per each new friend, a substantial 
increase compared with the average 
number of new holes per new friend of 
4.96 (see  table 1 ). 
 Table 7 
 Results of OLS Regression Predicting Self-Monitoring Differences in the Rate of Structural Hole Formation 
(N = 123)* 
 New Holes per New Friend 
 Variable  Model 1  Model 2 
Gender –.16 
(.60)
.60 
(.44)
Function = 1 –1.46 
(1.29)
.58 
(.96)
Function = 2 –1.46 
(1.14)
.06 
(.84)
Function = 3 1.41 • 
(.61)
.18 
(.46)
Function = 4 3.17 ••• 
(.83)
1.66 •• 
(.62)
Tenure .06 • 
(.03)
.04 
(.02)
Performance T1 .91 •• 
(.33)
.43 
(.24)
Self-monitoring 1.79 ••• 
(.51)
1.00 •• 
(.38)
Network size T1 .27 ••• 
(.03)
Model F 6.88 ••• 23.10 ••• 
F change † 12.42 ••• 103.37 ••• 
R 2 .33 .65
R 2 change † .07 .32
Adjusted R 2 .28 .62
 •  p < .05;  ••  p < .01;  •••  p < .001.
 * Entries represent parameter estimates; standard errors are in parentheses. The intercept was included in the OLS 
regression models but is not reported here.
 † F change and R 2 change statistics compare the goodness of ﬁ t a model with the previous nested model. Model 1 is 
compared with the model with control variables (gender, function, tenure, and performance).
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indicate that there was also substantial churn in brokerage 
positions during that period. 
 Results reported in  table 6 , model 3 show that self-monitoring 
was positively associated with occupying the same holes ( p < 
.05), though individuals who initially have more structural 
holes in their networks may be more likely, through chance 
alone, to retain and close holes over time. Results reported in 
model 4 show that the effect of self-monitoring on same 
holes was fully mediated by the number of brokerage posi-
tions individuals occupied at T1. Finally, the results reported in 
model 6 in  table 6 show that, controlling for the signiﬁ cant 
effects of the number of prior structural holes in an individu-
al’s network, the individual’s self-monitoring personality was 
not signiﬁ cantly related to hole closure. Overall, these results 
show weak support for hypothesis 6a and no support for 
hypothesis 6b. 
 DISCUSSION 
 Our study of friendship relations in a radiology department 
produced evidence of considerable network churn, and we 
were able to trace the volume, composition, and pattern of 
this churn to individual differences in self-monitoring perso-
nality. High self-monitors were more likely than low self- 
monitors to attract new friends over time; and whereas the 
new friends that low self-monitors attracted tended to be 
friends of their previous friends, the new friends that high 
self-monitors attracted tended to be relative strangers, 
unconnected to their previous friends. The inﬂ uence of 
self-monitoring personality appeared to extend even to the 
changing composition of individuals’ friendship networks with 
regard to functional area. Furthermore, not only were high 
self-monitors more likely to occupy brokerage positions 
bridging disconnected others in the friendship networks at a 
given point in time, they were more likely to occupy new 
brokerage positions over time, a relationship that was signiﬁ -
cant even after we controlled for the effects of prior job 
performance and prior occupancy of brokerage positions. The 
overall picture painted by these results is one of personality 
shaping the dynamics of individuals’ social networks. 
 Implications for Theory and Research 
 We found that the relationship between self-monitoring and 
network brokerage was stable over a period of nine months, 
but the stability of this relationship did not imply stability in 
network ties. Although the number of structural holes in the 
overall friendship network was about the same, some of the 
structural holes at T1 had been closed by T2 (7.5 percent), 
some remained open (13 percent), and a number of new 
structural holes came into existence (86 percent). These 
results depart from the conventional expectation that work-
place friendships will be stable and add to the scant evidence 
(e.g., Burt, 2002) on the appearance and disappearance of 
structural holes over time. We found that individual differ-
ences in self-monitoring personality were related to the 
addition of new holes in one’s friendship network. The 
relationship between network brokerage and workplace 
success may apply across different kinds of people, as prior 
research has shown (Burt, 2005). But the possibility that 
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different kinds of people may be more likely to gravitate 
toward different kinds of network structures nonetheless 
deserves attention if we are to gain a better understanding of 
how the network structures we inhabit appear to retain their 
stability even as the ties underlying these structures change 
over time (cf. Moody, 2002). 
 Our study shows that apparently stable network forms such 
as structural holes can emerge through a set of ﬂ uid changes 
in the ties that make up the structures. To capture more fully 
the ﬂ uidity of network relations, we urge researchers to 
consider additional dimensions of network churn, such as its 
acceleration and the temporal ordering or sequence of tie 
changes (Moody, McFarland, and Bender-deMoll, 2005). We 
examined changes from one network state to another. A 
more ﬁ ne-grained understanding of the sequence of interac-
tions that generated this change will require research designs 
that capture network changes in a more continuous fashion 
than was possible through the two discrete snapshots of 
network structure in our study (for a discussion of possible 
options, see Doreian and Stokman, 2003; Dorogovtsev and 
Mendes, 2003). 
 One of the persistent criticisms of social network research 
has focused on its neglect of human agency (see Kilduff and 
Brass, 2010). Under the historical inﬂ uence of structural 
sociology, organizational network research has largely 
bypassed the role of individuals in creating the very social 
networks that constrain their attitudes and behaviors. When 
network theories have acknowledged the psychology of 
individuals at all, the tendency has been to assume a general-
ized individual, best resembling the homo-economicus of 
neo-classical economics (Burt, 1992). Some have argued that 
richer psychological theories may be necessary to correct for 
the overreliance on rational choice models of individual action 
in social networks (e.g., Kilduff and Krackhardt, 2008; Burt, 
2010). We have tried to inject greater agency into network 
theorizing by explicitly accounting for actors’ heterogeneity in 
terms of individual differences in self-monitoring personality. 
Future work could build individual differences in self-monitoring 
into templates for agent-based models (and network theoriz-
ing more generally) to provide richer, more realistic explana-
tions of how and why network structures emerge and change 
over time (cf. Buskens and van de Rijt, 2008; Reagans and 
Zuckerman, 2008). 
 The results of our study are consistent with previous cross-
sectional work that has shown a link between self-monitoring 
and the occupancy of brokerage positions in workplace 
friendship networks (Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass, 2001). Our 
study shows how self-monitoring inﬂ uences not just the 
structure of social networks at a given point in time but also 
the dynamics that help (re)produce networks over time. 
Relative to their low self-monitoring counterparts, high 
self-monitors were more likely to attract new friends who 
were unconnected with their previous friends and who helped 
them more efﬁ ciently increase the number of brokerage 
opportunities present in their networks over time. Our 
research extends previous theorizing by identifying some of 
the mechanisms that help produce the previously reported 
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correspondence between individuals’ self-monitoring orienta-
tions and the structure of their social networks. 
 Our study has emphasized the seemingly natural tendency for 
people to gravitate toward network structures that ﬁ t their 
personality. Understanding the extent to which such agency 
is deliberative and goal-oriented rather than routine and 
habitual will require further study (on the different compo-
nents of human agency, see Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). 
What is clear is that theoretical accounts of how social 
networks inﬂ uence individual attitudes and behaviors should 
take more seriously the agentic processes that help shape 
social networks over time. People may have no control 
over the situations they are assigned in experimental studies, 
but they have considerably more latitude in choosing and 
shaping their social situations in the “real” world. Although 
the degree of control people exercise over their social net-
works may be larger than traditionally assumed in network 
research, we are not suggesting that it is unbounded. Our 
results show that whereas self-monitoring was positively 
related to the addition of new structural holes, contrary to 
expectations, self-monitoring was not related to their mainte-
nance after controlling for the number of structural holes each 
individual occupied at T1. A broker may wish to maintain a 
bridge, but the parties being bridged may prefer to close the 
hole by forging a direct connection with each other. Future 
work should attempt to model how the potentially competing 
structural preferences of interacting individuals shape the 
patterning of social networks over time. 
 We have emphasized the effects of personality on network 
dynamics, but we are not suggesting that personality is 
destiny. One of the practical implications of our study is that it 
may be worthwhile for organizations to invest in programs to 
help people better understand and potentially modify their 
preferred approach to managing social relations. Similarly, to 
the extent that high self-monitors appear to be natural bro-
kers, it may be useful to train managers to identify individuals 
in terms of their self-monitoring personality and to use this 
information in deciding who might be best suited to the task 
of building desired bridges to help improve the coordination of 
work (cf. Salancik, 1995). 
 Whereas the effects of structural holes on performance have 
been the topic of numerous investigations, the effects of 
performance on structural holes are rarely studied. Although 
not the focus of our investigation, we found that workplace 
performance predicted the occupancy of new brokerage 
positions nine months later. The direction of causality here 
seems to run in the opposite direction to that posited in 
structural holes theory. Rather than superior performance 
being the result of the information and control advantages of 
spanning structural holes, it may be that those who exhibit 
superior performance are better able to leverage their reputa-
tional resources to create advantageous social networks. Our 
results suggest that it is important to understand the mecha-
nisms that generate the distribution of network structures if 
one is to determine whether performance advantages arise 
from occupancy of network structures (cf. Lee, 2010). 
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 We analyzed the effects of self-monitoring personality on 
friendship relations. Unlike workﬂ ow or advice relations, 
friendship in the workplace is relatively discretionary and is 
therefore likely to reﬂ ect the effects of individual personality. 
There is evidence that high self-monitors are more likely to be 
sought out for advice (Flynn et al., 2006). But the relationship 
between self-monitoring and brokerage dynamics in such 
instrumental relations is unclear. Individuals may think more 
strategically about their advice relations than they do about 
their friendship relations at work. Low self-monitors may be 
more willing to forge and dissolve their advice relations (as 
compared with their friendship relations) to achieve instru-
mental goals, even if this requires them to act in ways that 
are incongruent with their natural dispositions. Future work 
should examine the effects of self-monitoring on brokerage 
across a broader set of workplace relations. 
 We have examined the effects of personality differences on 
the structure and dynamics of brokerage in friendship net-
works within a work organization. Future work, drawing 
inspiration and ideas from the strategic choice (Child, 1972) and 
upper echelons (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; see Hambrick, 
2005, for a review) perspectives, could examine how the 
self-monitoring personalities of powerful corporate ofﬁ cers 
inﬂ uence the structure and dynamics of their ﬁ rms’ networks. 
Given the evidence for a chief executive ofﬁ cer’s (CEO’s) 
personality shaping ﬁ rm-level strategic action (e.g., Chatterjee 
and Hambrick, 2007; Nadkarni and Herrmann, 2010), the 
self-monitoring personality of CEOs may be especially rel-
evant for understanding the volume, composition, and 
patterning of alliances that a ﬁ rm enters and disbands over 
time. Previous work at the organizational level of analysis has 
emphasized how the existing network of a ﬁ rm’s collaborative 
ties inﬂ uences the subsequent ties the ﬁ rm forms (e.g., Gulati 
and Gargiulo, 1999; Zaheer and Soda, 2009). We encourage 
researchers studying interﬁ rm networks to supplement this 
structural logic by considering the possible effects of psycho-
logical differences in CEO personality on the dynamics of 
interorganizational networks. 
 Our study has deliberately given more attention to tie genera-
tion than to tie dissolution because self-monitoring theory 
offers a clearer rationale for the former than the latter. Net-
work churn, however, involves not just the generation of new 
ties but also their dissolution over time. Although published 
data on tie dissolution in organizations are rare, a study of 
employees in the investment banking division of a large 
ﬁ nancial organization (Burt, 2000) found that the pattern of 
decay in social network ties was similar to that predicted by 
the “liability of newness” mechanism posited by the theory of 
population ecology (Stinchcombe, 1965; Hannan and Freeman, 
1989). Decay was a power function of time in which the 
probability of decay decreased with the years that a relation-
ship had existed. It could be that this structural tendency is 
moderated by self-monitoring personality, a possibility we 
could not test in this study because we lacked data on the 
length of time that a relationship had been in existence. A 
fuller appreciation of how self-monitoring is related to network 
churn will require richer temporal data on relationships. 
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 A potential limitation of our study was our exclusive focus on 
the self-monitoring theory of personality. We focused on 
self-monitoring because it is a theory of expressive control and 
impression management—skills that are important for broker-
age in social networks. It may be that other measures of 
personality are useful for predicting other aspects of network 
structure (e.g., Klein et al., 2004) and dynamics. For example, 
measures of “entrepreneurial personality” (Burt, Jannotta, and 
Mahoney, 1998) could be relevant for predicting the strategic 
dissolution of ties because, unlike high self-monitors, such 
individuals are less concerned with preserving a friendly 
image than with strategically maximizing the possibilities for 
control available through brokerage, even if this means 
dissolving ties. There are concerns that the number of 
measures of personality one must consider is large (e.g., Burt, 
2010: 224), but the number of measures of network structure 
that are available for use is also large (and expanding). We 
believe that clear theory is necessary to guide decisions about 
which variables—whether these are personality variables or 
network variables—are likely to be relevant in the pursuit of 
speciﬁ c research questions (cf. Kilduff and Brass, 2010). 
 The organization we examined in this study was located in 
the Netherlands. The fact that our longitudinal results were 
consistent with previous results from a North American 
sample enhances conﬁ dence in our results. Yet it is possible 
that had we selected for study an organization located in a 
country with vastly different views about the relative desirabil-
ity of brokerage in friendship networks—or had we selected 
an organization with a vastly different normative culture, 
irrespective of the country in which it was located—our 
results may have been different (cf. Emirbayer and Goodwin, 
1994; Pachucki and Breiger, 2010). In contexts that empha-
size the desirability of network closure, high self-monitors, 
given their greater sensitivity to normative expectations, may 
prefer closed networks (cf. Xiao and Tsui, 2007). High self-
monitors may also prefer closed networks in contexts in 
which value and inﬂ uence are generated through the closing 
of holes (e.g., Simmel, 1950: 145–162; Coleman, 1990: 
175–196; Brass, 2009). Future work using diverse organiza-
tional samples is needed to better understand the boundary 
conditions of the relationship between self-monitoring 
 personality and brokerage dynamics. 
 Social network research has been preoccupied with demon-
strating that the structure of social networks powerfully 
inﬂ uences important outcomes, such as workplace perfor-
mance and career success (Borgatti et al., 2009). This almost 
exclusive focus on outcomes has meant that the origins and 
dynamics of social networks have received comparatively 
little attention. In this study, we have not focused on the 
effects of network structure on individuals but on the effects 
of individuals on network structure. Building on the idea that 
individuals inhabit social structures that reﬂ ect their concep-
tions of self, our study has suggested that the etiology and 
dynamics of churn in workplace friendship networks are 
rooted in individual differences in self-monitoring personality. 
By helping shape the characteristics of their social networks 
over time, individuals help determine which structures have 
an opportunity to inﬂ uence their behaviors. To understand a 
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person’s behaviors and attitudes as a function of their social 
networks is to provide but a partial and potentially misleading 
picture because social networks are themselves shaped and 
sustained through individual action. The more we are able to 
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networks over time, the closer we will be to understanding 
the processes responsible for the effects of social networks 
in organizations. 
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 APPENDIX  
We used the following procedures to compute the measures for same holes, 
closed holes, and new holes: 
1.  Same holes denote the number of brokerage positions that remained the 
same at T1 and at T2. We calculated the number of times A occupied a 
brokerage position between B and C at both T1 and T2, using the following 
formula: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )2max max1 1 2 1 1 2S ST TY = X .X x X .X . X .X
 Where 
 X 1 and  X 2 denote the adjacency matrices for the friendship network at T1 
and T2; 
 “.” denotes an elementwise multiplication; 
 “ x ” denotes a product of matrices; 
 “ T ” denotes a transpose of a matrix; 
 “ Smax ” symmetrization using the maximum rule; 
 and “
_
” matrix manipulation where no ties are coded as 1 and reported 
ties as 0. 
 Elementwise multiplication of the adjacency matrices and transposing the 
resulting matrix ensured that ego had the same pair of incoming friendship 
ties at T1 and T2. Symmetrization using the rule that there is a tie between 
two alters if either of them reported it, recoding no ties as 1 at both T1 and 
T2, and then computing the product of resulting matrices, which was on a 
ﬁ nal step multiplied cell by cell by the transposed matrix ensured that there 
were no ties between ego’s pair of alters. The number of  same holes was 
then calculated as a row sum of matrix  Y 1 divided by two, because the 
procedure counted no tie from B to C and no tie from C to B as two 
occurrences of a structural hole. 
2.  Closed holes are brokerage positions that have been closed over time: A 
brokered between B and C at T1, but at T2 there was either a friendship tie 
from B to C or a friendship tie from C to B or both. We ﬁ rst counted a raw 
number of such occurrences. More speciﬁ cally, we calculated the number 
of ties between alters at T2 for which there were structural holes at T1 as 
a row sum of matrix  Y 2 using the following formula: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )T TY = X .X x X .X . X .Xmax2 1 2 1 2 1 2S
 Where 
 X 1 and  X 2 denote the adjacency matrices for the friendship network at T1 
and T2; 
 “.” denotes an elementwise multiplication; 
 “ x ” denotes a product of matrices; 
 “ T ” denotes a transpose of a matrix; 
 “ Smax ” symmetrization using the maximum rule; 
 and “
_
” matrix manipulation where no ties are coded as 1 and reported 
ties as 0. 
 As in the measure of same holes, elementwise multiplication of the 
adjacency matrices and transposing the resulting matrix ensured that ego 
had the same pair of incoming friendship ties at T1 and at T2. Symmetriza-
tion and recoding of no ties as 1 in the adjacency matrix at T1, then 
multiplying cell by cell with the adjacency matrix at T2 (resulting matrix 
contains new ties), and subsequently computing the product of the resulting 
matrices ensured that there was no tie between ego’s pair of alters at T1, 
and a tie appeared (in either direction) between the same pair of alters at 
T2. Because this procedure counts each tie between a pair of alters 
separately, if there are ties in both directions (from B to C and from C to B), 
they would be counted as two separate occurrences of  closed holes . To 
correct for this, we computed the number of times a hole was closed with a 
bidirectional tie between B and C, using the following formula, which is 
similar to the formula described above, with the exception that the 
adjacency matrix at T2 is ﬁ rst symmetrized using the minimum rule to count 
only ties between alters that were in both directions at T2 and that did not 
exist at T1: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )T TY = X .X x X .X . X .Xmax min3 1 2 1 2 1 2S S
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 Where 
 X 1 and  X 2 denote the adjacency matrices for the friendship network at T1 
and T2; 
 “.” denotes an elementwise multiplication; 
 “ x ” denotes a product of matrices; 
 “ T ” denotes a transpose of a matrix; 
 “ Smax ” symmetrization using the maximum rule; 
 “ Smin ” symmetrization using the minimum rule; 
 and “
_
” matrix manipulation where no ties are coded as 1 and reported 
ties as 0. 
 Finally the number of  closed holes was computed by subtracting the row 
sum of  Y 3 divided by two (because a tie from B to C and a tie from C to B at 
T2 were counted separately) from the row sum of  Y 2 . 
3.  New holes are structural holes, deﬁ ned in the same way as above (a 
friendship tie from B to A and from C to A, and no friendship tie between B 
and C), but in which at T2 a person A brokers between a different pair of 
alters than at T1. This measure was computed by subtracting the number 
of same holes between T1 and T2 from the number of structural holes 
counted at T2. 
4.  Opened holes are a subset of new holes that developed in a speciﬁ c way: 
at T1 there was a closed triad (a friendship tie from B to A and from C to A, 
and a friendship tie between B and C). At T2 there was no friendship tie 
between B and C, while the ties from B to A and C to A remained 
unchanged, leaving an open structural hole. We calculated the number of 
structural holes that developed in this way as a row sum of matrix  Y 4 using 
the following formula: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )T TY = X .X x X .X . X .Xmax4 1 2 1 2 1 2S
 Where 
 X 1 and  X 2 denote the adjacency matrices for the friendship network at T1 
and T2; 
 “.” denotes an elementwise multiplication; 
 “ x ” denotes a product of matrices; 
 “ T ” denotes a transpose of a matrix; 
 “ Smax ” symmetrization using the maximum rule; 
 and “
_
” matrix manipulation where no ties are coded as 1 and reported 
ties as 0. 
 As in the measures of same and closed holes above, elementwise multiplica-
tion of the adjacency matrices and transposing the resulting matrix ensured 
that ego had the same pair of incoming friendship ties at T1 and at T2. 
Symmetrization and recoding of no ties as 1 in the adjacency matrix at T2, 
then multiplying cell by cell with the adjacency matrix at T1 (resulting matrix 
contains lost ties), and subsequently computing the product of the resulting 
matrices ensured that there was a tie between ego’s pair of alters at T1 and 
that tie disappeared between the same pair of alters at T2. 
 The number of  opened holes needs to be subtracted from the number of 
 new holes when we want to investigate the net effects on the number of 
ego’s structural holes of adding a new alter. 
